INTRODUCTION
THE story of State-investor dispute resolution is one that relates to the process of decision-making that transnational corporations undertake in risk factor analysis when considering whether to invest capital in a particular country (jurisdiction). In this sense, the international community has created a variety of international dispute or resolution methodologies, including the Washington Convention for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("Washington Convention or the ICSID Convention"),' and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), that enable less developed countries ("LDCs") to signal the Community of Nations, particularly, and perhaps most significantly, capital-exporting countries, that they have embraced a system of protection of foreign direct investments ("FDI"). 2 Once sent, these sig- The purpose of this article is to research the historical interaction of ICSJD and Latin America in an effort to suggest that these "opt-out" countries may not be a mere aberrational phenomenon in the region subject to surface dismissal. For this reason. Section one of this paper explores the roots of the initial Latin American rejection and subsequent acceptance of the ICSID as an effective protection for foreign investors. The first part of the section provides a brief summary of the Centre's jurisdictional requirements with a special emphasis on the doctrinal issue of consent and the BITS as a form of expressing consent in advance.
Section two of this paper analyzes the general growing hostility against ICSID in the region. The first part of this section summarizes the origins and history of the ICSID, analyzes how Latin American countries initially approached the ICSID initiative, and explores the rise of the ICSID in the region during the 1990s. The second part of this section contains an analysis of the implications and consequences of Bolivia's withdrawal from ICSLD, and also discusses the repercussions of Ecuador's exclusion, its subsequent denunciation, and Venezuela's hostile approach.
Finally, the article concludes by suggesting that the system of protection of FDI in Latin America may be on the eve of a drastic change. If, moved by the engine of ideology, the rest of Latin America follows the examples of Bolivia and Ecuador and denounces the Washington Convention in favor of a new "regionalized" forum to resolve FDI disputes, the future of the ICSID in Latin America will become uncertain. 
ICSID AND LATIN

A. LCSID CLAIMS & ARBITRATION WITHOUT PRIVITY
ICSLD is an autonomous institution established by the Washington Convention in 1965, under the auspices of the World Bank.' 0 The stated purpose of this institution is "to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States.""I According to ICSID, the core of the Washington Convention was to ease the flow of capitals between natioflS' 2 by: (a) removing barriers to "private investment posed by noncommercial [mainly political] risks," and (b) establishing a "specialized international method" to resolve investment disputes, which did not then exist, thus maximizing microeconomic conditions for capital-exporting countries and entrepreneurs and capital-importing nations)1 3 Once a country signs and ratifies the Washington Convention, it becomes a member of the ICSID. But becoming a member is not enough to provide foreign investors with sufficient and efficient protection. The country must act further by actually consenting to the Centre's jurisdiction. This consent may be effectuated in different ways, but the most important way is known as "arbitration without privity." Professor Jan Paulsson introduced this term in 1995 to explain a new "world" in international arbitration, which relates to the investor-state system of protection that, in his own words: "is one where the claimant need not have a contractual relationship with the defendant and where tables could not be turned: the defendant could not have initiated arbitration, nor is it certain of being able even to bring a counterclaim." 1 4 In his work, Professor Paulsson describes different initiatives in the investor-state system of protection arena, in which the investor may resort to arbitration notwithstanding the absence of a prior arbitration agreement. Among these devices are: national investment protection laws, BITs, the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).1s forum providing facilities for the resolution of legal disputes between eligible parties, through conciliation or arbitration procedures. Recourse to the ICSID facilities is always subject to the parties' consent"). , by Canada, the United States, and Mexico, an investor from one of these countries may elect to sue a host country either under the UNCITRAL rules, or under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. However, a condition precedent to select the latter path is that the investor, or the country where the investment has been made, must be a member of the Washington Convention; and, as of November 4, 2007 only the United States had ratified the Convention (Canada, for instance, signed the Convention in 2006, but has not ratified it, and consequently, it has not entered into force in that country). Another interesting aspect about the procedural framework
B. JURISDicriONAL REQUIREMENTS OF AN ICSID CLAIM
Prior to perfecting a claim [on the merits] before the ICSID, certain jurisdictional criteria must be met: (i) the investor bringing the claim must be a national of a State member of the Washington Convention [jurisdiction ratione personae]; (ii) similarly, the investment must have been made in a Contracting State of the Washington Convention [also jurisdiction ratione personae]; (iii) the dispute must be a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, in the terms established by caseload of the ICSID Tribunals readily available [jurisdiction ratione materiae]; and (iv) perhaps most importantly, express 'consent' to arbitrate must be given in writing by both parties.' 6 While it is not the aim of this paper to provide an extensive exegesis on these jurisdictional elements, it is critical to discuss their contours as a conceptual predicate to the development of this analysis.
The first two criteria relate to the nationality of the harmed investor and place of investment;' 7 the former, the nationality-membership requirement includes the exception of cases arising under the additional facility rules. For instance, in disputes arising under the NAIFTA, the only cases that can be decided by an ICSJD Tribunal are those involving a party related to the United States. This would be the case of a claim filed by U.S. investors against Canada or Mexico; and the case of a claim filed by Canadian and/or Mexican investors against the U.S. as well. Another interesting discussion on this topic that has been particularly relevant in Latin America is the so-called practice of "treaty shopping" and corporate engineering.' 8 These terms refer to a practice common in the field, of NAFTA arbitration to comment is that the only parties entitled to bring a claim and assert jurisdiction under NAFTA, are investors from a State party. And, the term 'investment' has been broadly defined by §1139 of NAFTA, thereby widening the jurisdictional reach of a NAFTA claim. Similarly, a panel of arbitrators, headed by Mr. Bernardo Cremades, established in Bayview Irrigation District v. Mexico, that "in order to determine whether the claims fall within Articles 1115 and 1116 it is therefore necessary to determine whether the Claimants are 'investors', and whether their claims are within the scope and coverage of Chapter 11."). , available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/professionals.cfm?u= Jean EngelmayerKal icki&action=view& id=254&viewpage=pu bl ications (these terms refer to a practice common in the field, where sophisticated attorneys seek to structure deals by using different corporate forms, with the intention to extend to investors the protection of a third country BIT, when their own home country where sophisticated attorneys seek to structure transactions by using different corporate forms, with the intent to extend to investors the protection of a third country BIT, where their own home country lacks BIT protection status. Likewise, the third criterion poses the difficulty of the definition of the term "investment."' 1 9 But there is sufficient precedent 2 0 set by ICSID awards that sets the grounds to define this term that provides for useful conceptual guidance. 2 ' For instance, in contractual claims,
[t]ribunals have found 'disputes arising directly out of an investment' to include disputes over capital contributions and other equity investments in companies and joint ventures, as well as non-equity direct investments via service contracts, transfer of technology, natural resource concession agreements, and projects for the construction and operation of production and service facilities in the host State. 2 2
Meanwhile, in non-contractual claims the tribunals have traditionally applied an even broader definition of "investment," to cover "the laying out of money or property in business ventures, so that it may produce a revenue or incom'e." 2 3
Finally the last criterion, the consent, as seen above, is deemed to be fundamental for the assertion of the jurisdiction of ICSID. Consent is "the explicit expression of both parties' acceptance of ICSID arbitration."1 24 According to §25 of the Convention, the consent must be given does not have one protecting their investment. In Aguas del Tunari, ICSID Case N.ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent's Objections to Jurisdiction (2005), an IC-SID Tribunal found that national routing was a valid and legitimate exercise of the Corporation that changed its ownership structure, in order to be able to claim jurisdiction under the Bolivia-Netherlands BIT. However, Kalicki notes that such a practice is now being taken care of by recent developments in BIT drafting, in which "Contracting States include a provision allowing a party to deny the benefits of the agreement to investors that have no 'substantial business activities' in their putative home country)." 19. REEDo, PAUL-SSON, & BLACKABY, supra note 15 (regarding the meaning of the phrase "legal dispute" in contractual investment disputes Reed, Paulsson & Blackaby held that "ICSID Tribunals have generally used the phrase to refer either to disputes regarding the existence or scope of a legal right or obligation, or to disputes regarding the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of a legal obligation." A classical example of this would be an expropriation of FDI made without just compensation, or a denial to honor payments of promissory notes (bonds)). 20. Notably, in the international arena, such as in the majority of Civil Law jurisdictions, judicial "precedent" is distinguishable from "stare decisis" in the sense that it does not refer to any binding authority of judicial/arbitral decisions or awards. Moreover, the importance of consent was underlined on the famous Report of the Executive Directors of the World Bank on the ICSJD Convention, prepared in 1965 at the origins of the Centre. 2 7 They referred to consent of the parties as being "the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre."1 2 8 Similarly, in relation to consent, the Directors stated that consent must exist prior to a request for arbitration or a request for conciliation. Some of the forms of consent permitted to satisfy the requirements of §25(1) are: (i) a clause included in an investment agreement providing for the submission to the Centre of future disputes arising out of that agreement; (ii) a compromise regarding a dispute which has already arisen; or (iii) a provision in the host state's investment promotion legislation offering to submit disputes arising out of certain classes of investments to the jurisdiction of the Centre, which would still require the investor's acceptance in writing. 2 9 The great academic discussion in this field arises from the third form of consent; specifically from the BITs, which once in force could be considered part of the country's internal legislation.
0
A parallel classification of the form of consent permitted is based on the source of the consent, whether contractual or not. Sometimes investors and states enter into 'investment contracts,' including an arbitration clause that grants jurisdiction to the Centre. 3 ' Conversely, in the vast majority of the cases, the states, in racing to get foreign capital, have consented in advance to the ICSID jurisdiction by including an arbitration BITs for the International business Community, because with these contracts developing countries may provide investors with credible commitments, and at the same time they would be able to bargain for a suitable special treatment). 25. Washington Convention, supra note 11. 26. Washington Cunventiun, supra note 11, art. 36(2). 27. Int'l Ctr. clause in BITs or multilateral investment treaties ("MITs") entered with other nations, 3 2 or even by including the sovereign's consent to arbitration in foreign investment legislation. As explained in this section, the latter would constitute cases of arbitration without privity.
C. WHY COUNTRIES ENTERED INTO BITs
A BIT is an agreement entered into by two nations with the purpose of stimulating the investment and trade between both nations by offering a framework of protections available to investors. Usually, the process of entering into a BIT makes sense when there is a prospect that the commercial relations among one state (a capital-importer State) and the nationals of the other state (capital-exporter) may improve. In part, this assertion may explain why the vast majority of the BITs bear a similar structure. According to one author, most BITs mimic two unsuccessful attempts to create a uniform approach to FDI in the international community, i.e., the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Convention, and the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. 3 4 The structure of a typical BIT is formed by a set of substantive protections that states offer to investors and by a clause granting jurisdiction to foreign tribunals to solve the claims that may arise under the treaty (whether considered to be consent, or a mere unilateral offer to consent) 35 The substantive protections usually contained in BITs are: (i) fair and equitable treatment; (ii) nondiscriminatory treatment; (iii) non-arbitrary or unreasonable treatment; (iv) full protection and security treatment; (v) treatment as favorable as that provided to national investors; (vi) ability to repatriate proceeds of the investment to home country; (vii) no expropriation without compensation; and (viii) the host country will honour its contractual and other legal obligations owed to the foreign investor (a.k.a., the umbrella clause). What we witnessed during the 1990s was an explosion of LDCs, in particular Latin American countries, embracing the Washington Convention, entering into hundreds of BITs, and also modifying their foreign investment legislation. We also experienced a plethora of claims against Latin American countries before this forum. When the trend commenced, BITs became "the preferred method of governing the relationship between foreign investors and host governments in developing countries."1 3 7
Professors Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons provide interesting and detailed data about the advent and spread of BITs. 38 They hold that competition among similarly situated countries explain, both theoretically and empirically, the spread of the BITs. 39 They also found an empirical basis for the assertion that the most important drivers of the spread of BIT's are also factors that heavily impacts investment decisions ." 0 For instance, they found that BITs are more valuable where political risk is endemic."' For these reasons, in order to attract capital, Latin American countries in the 1990s needed to enter into these treaties, or modify their internal legislation, waiving part of their immunity by agreeing beforehand to the jurisdiction of a third part y," 2 in most cases, the ICSID. With this system of protection, investors sought to effectively de-politicize investments disputes." 3 Indeed, they would be able to mitigate political risks normally associated with the functioning of business in Latin America by removing these disputes from the internal (and sometimes compromised) judiciaries, as well as "traditional diplomatic channels" by directly submitting them to arbitration.""4
D. THE NO-DE-TOKYO
The ICSID Convention was not initially adopted by any of the Latin American countries. In fact, when the Convention was first discussed in different regional meetings of the World Bank' 45 Latin American coun- 52 Fourth, the Latin American countries rejected the argument that their domestic courts were not ideal (in terms of efficiency and fairness) fora to try these claims . 53 Last, Latin American countries were suspicious of arbitral proceedings as opposed to judicial proceedings, primarily because of the "past association with foreign intervention, of arbitration and a private person."1 5 4
Meanwhile, FDI was not left unprotected in Latin America. Investors and nations bargained for tailored solutions in order to limit the exposure of the former to political risks. The result of these contractual solutions was the "internationalization" of investment contracts 5 5 by systematically including in these contracts sophisticated arbitration, choice-of-law, and stabilization clauses . A few decades after the birth of the Convention, the Latin American countries modified their approach to it and gradually decided to embrace it. In the 1980s the first Latin American countries to join the Convention were Ecuador, Honduras, and El Salvador. In the 1990s the rest of the Latin American countries, with the exceptions of Mexico and Brazil, joined the Convention. one given to nationals. Initially this doctrine was created as a legal answer of the Latin American Nations to insulate themselves from pressure and attacks of foreign countries on behalf of forcign investors. However, several decades later this doctrine was revitalized in the context of an international effort to protect foreign investment. According to a recent paper in the subject: "for investors in Latin America, the possibility of direct arbitration against a government represented a significant change from the Calvo Doctrine, according to which a government's liability toward foreigners can be no greater than that owed to nationals. As a result, disputes between foreigners and a host country could only be decided by the country's own legal system."). 
52.
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE GROWING RESISTANCE
Along with the strong supporters of ICSID and the investor-state System of protection, there is also a growing number of detractors and criticism. While some of the critiques seem to have more scientific grounds, 6 5 others appear to contain an ideological component.66 Because BITS and the investor-State system of protection pertains to a flow of capital from capital-exporters countries to capital-importers countries, it is possible to measure whether these efforts have succeeded in bringing wealth into a particular country within a specific period of time.
Although this article does not purport to draw conclusions on whether BITS and the investor-state system of protection have succeeded in each particular country of the region, it does analyze how different Latin American countries have recently reacted to the system. Today, the warm welcome to the ICSID system has largely disappeared and the relationship between the ICSID and Latin America has soured.
On April 29, 2007 in Caracas the Presidents of Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua held the V Summit of the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our America ("ALBA"), which is an alternative agreement from these countries in bloc to the investor-state system of protection However, in a more recent study, Salacuse and Sullivan conducted their own study, and reviewed both of these research studies, to conclude in the opposite direction, stating that "BITs have a particularly strong effect on encouraging FDI in developing countries. In short, the grand bargain between developing and developed countries that underlies BITs, the bargain of investment promotion in return for investment protection, seems to have been achieved, although the effect of the bargain is only realized slowly after the BIT is signed." See Jeswald W. These announcements have echoed some of the strongest criticism to the investor-state system of protection. Nonetheless, they can also be explained by the recent wave of nationalizations and expropriations of FDI undertaken in the region, which in most cases bears an ideological explanation. 7 awards are not subject to appeal, the Washington Convention provides grounds for the interpretation ( §50), revision ( §51), and annulment of the award ( §52). An award may not be amended through annulment. Annulment would erase the award entirely, thereby providing the parties with a chance to re-instate the claim. However, the annulment system is designed to safeguard the integrity and not the outcome of the award).
of the private investors shows that the system lacks neutrality and impartiality; 74 (Ili) only private companies may sue at this forum; and (iv) the cost to litigate these claims is very high.
5
These announcements are not galvanized by scientific or statistical data but by ideology. In other words, they are driven by a personal conviction that FDI, even if it does foster development and prosperity, is wrong, promotes imperialism, and thus deserves no effective protection. In this sense, an effective system of protection of FDI, such as ICSID, could be seen as an undue waiver of sovereignty. If this presumption proves to be true, it would be very hard, if not impossible, to predict what will be the future of ICSID in the region.
Argentina's case-study is also critical. Indeed, Argentina's still uncertain willingness to honor eventual final and binding ICSID awards will be determinative to ICSID's authority in the region. million, when they were seeking relief for almost the equivalent of $311 million. 75. The rationale of this argument is that given that prior consent is critical, and that in many cases, once a dispute has arisen, an investor is entitle to sue in ICSID due to the existence of a previous unilateral offer to consent to arbitration by the State (e.g., a BIT); but the converse would not be true, because once a dispute arises, if the State is seeking to sue the investor, it would be impossible to obtain its consent to arbitrate. However, this argument may be underestimating the bargaining power of the country, even when the dispute has arisen. Although §36 technically entitles a country to initiate an arbitration against a foreign investor, the only case in which a government might sue an investor under the Washington Convention, would be a case in which it contracted directly with the investor. This is what happened in Tanz Cavalho implemented a currency convertibility system, which fixed the Argentine Peso to the U.S. Dollar. This measure, along with many others, such as privatizations and liberalizations of interest rates, were successful in halting the hyper-inflation experienced in the 1980s, and boosting the economy. However, after a few years, and given the growing budget deficit the convertibility measure became a foreign investors against Argentina. Needless to say these events caused Argentina the dubious distinction of breaking all records as the country with more claims filed in ICSID, 7 8 and potentially subject to the largest monetary awards entered against it7
As a result of this trend, Argentina raised two defenses in most of the cases: the applicability of non-preclusive measures clause (NPM) contained in the BIT to object to such disputes; and the state-of-necessity as a doctrine of customary international law. 80 So far only two arbitral panels have dismissed the claims on the basis of the "necessity defense."1 8 1
In response to the cases in which the arbitral tribunals have found for the investors, Argentina has started annulment proceedings under §52 of the Convention, along with a request for stay of enforcement, 8 On May 2, 2007 Bolivia formally notified the ICSID Secretariat of its formal withdrawal from the Centre and the Washington Convention. 87 This pronouncement raised a series of legal issues. At the core of the judicial discussion of Bolivia's withdrawal and its consequences, there is an underlying discussion about the reach of consent on ICSID claims. Even where the arguments may turn out to be highly scholastic, the po-01/3, stated that an ICSID award may not be enforceable prior recognition or validation of internal courts. A month later the ad hoc annulment committee of the case deciding a motion to lift the stay, gave Argentina a sixty-day period to reconsider its position about the "extent of its obligation to pay on the final award. tential implications of adopting one posture over others may result in entirely different procedural consequences.
Background
Bolivia's decision to withdraw from ICSID arose in the midst of a drastic change in the hydrocarbons sector undertaken by the Bolivian government. Joining the trend of other Latin American Nations, President Jaime Paz Zamora (who served from 1989 to 1993), implemented in Bolivia a major legal reform in order to attract FDI. 8 8 During Paz Zamora's presidency, the Legislature enacted the first Investment and Privatization Acts, and the country became a member of the Multilateral Investment Agency (MIGA), the overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and ICSID.89 Also, approximately thirty percent of the country's BITs were signed during Paz Zamora's presidency. 9 0 In 1994 President Sdnchez de Lozada (Paz Zamora's successor), who remembered well the hyper-inflation experienced in the country in the 1980s, 9 1 privatized several state-owned companies, including five of the largest companies in the country (through the Capitalization Act of 1994).92 Because of Bolivia's vast reserves of non-associated natural gas, the most important of these privatizations related to the natural gas industry. The 1996 modification of the Hydrocarbons Law was essential to "the Bolivian government wants the private sector to be perfectly aligned with the productive sector-hydrocarbons, mining, and services. That is a three-stage process. The government is selling all the productive enterprises, although there are more than sixty, such as ceramic, textiles, and small airlines. Joint ventures in hydrocarbons and mining are also being undertaken because, due to constitutional restrictions, the government cannot sell them. We are also moving into services, but regulatory framework must first be developed. Federal regulatory agencies, which we do not have, are good in certain instances. the privatization of the hydrocarbons industry. 93 Among other controversial provisions, the new law established royalties for up to eighteen percent of the gas production. 94 Simultaneously, new contracts for the exploration and exploitation of non-associated gas were negotiated and entered into by the Bolivian government and private foreign investors, by-passing the Constitutional mandate of legislative approval. For this same reason these contracts would be invalidated some years later. 9 5 It is important to underscore, however, that FDI bloomed in Bolivia overall during the 1990s. 96 Sdnchez de Lozada's first term (1993-1997) was followed by a former dictator and retired General, Hugo Banzer (1997-2001).97 President Banzer continued the trend of privatization and 'modernization,' and put a special emphasis on the eradication of coca plantations, until he had to resign because of a serious medical condition. 98 His Vice-President, Jorge Quiroga, took office and concluded the term a year later. 99 Sdnchez de Lozada subsequently served a second term, in which he heavily raised taxes, after the adoption of an IMIF program, and faced the turmoil of the so-called 'gas war. 102 The new law proposed a raise in the taxes associated with production and increased the percentage of State participation in hydrocarbons activities, including the production of oil and gas. 103 the same day the Decree was issued, drawing international attention and prompting statements of concern from Bolivia's largest investors, Brazil and Spain. Although these investors renewed and strengthened their threats to take Bolivia to international arbitration, none followed through: all ultimately signed new contracts within the timeframe specified by Decree 28701 and remain operating in Bolivia today"). 
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But even with a constitutional provision outlawing LCSID and other foreign tribunals' Jurisdiction, an ICSID panel will still be entirely independent to find jurisdiction in the case a claim arises in such forum.
Bolivia Membership Status
Given that Bolivia's withdrawal was formally communicated to the IC- There are grounds to believe that by registering this case the ICSID did not take any posture on the following discussion about consent, since at that date, Bolivia was still technically a member State of the Washington Convention. The authors Tietje, Nowrot, and Wackernagel, however, believe otherwise. The ICSID Secretariat, by registering the case, found that the case was not 'manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Centre,' in the sense established by §36(3) of the Convention."
5 According to these authors, by taking this action the JCSID Secretariat adopted a position contrary to the potential argument that Bolivia was not subject to the Centre's jurisdiction since the date of the notification of denunciation (May 2, 2007), and not six months later, as established in §72.116
From 'Offer to Consent' to [just] 'Consent'
The effects of a Bolivia's denunciation of the Washington Convention raise the topic of the interplay between §25(1), §72 and, §71 of the Convention. The first two articles contain references to the consent of the parties, while the third section relates to right to denunciation. And, §71 of the same section establish that: "[a]ny Contracting State may denounce this Convention by written notice to the depositary of this Convention. The denunciation shall take effect six months after receipt of such notice."' 1 9 Then, the critical question is whether the effects of the protection contained in §71 may be extended due to the mandate of §25(1), even after the denunciation of the Washington Convention under §72. Any analysis in this area must pay special attention to the different sources of consent, whether contractual (through an investment agreement), or non-contractual (through Investment Protection Laws, BITs, or MITs). For instance, if a BIT is found to constitute consent in the meaning of §25(1), the denunciation of the Convention as per §72, may not affect the ability of investors who are nationals of the other contracting country of the BIT, to hail the host country before the ICSID, during the existence of such consent, which is also to say "during the validity of the BIT."
The most controversial issue here is the legal nature of the arbitration clause contained in most BITs. In this particular issue there are some differing points of view. While some scholars believe that at most a BIT contains a unilateral offer to consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre which must be "perfected" by further acceptance by the investor, others believe that a BIT pledges the consent of the country to submit to the jurisdiction of the Centre during the validity of such instrument. The potential applicability of any of these views in Bolivia is clear: the supporters of the offer to consent theory believe that no other case could be filed by or against Bolivia before the ICSID, after November 2, 2007; while the 
Offer to Consent
Professor Christoph Schreuer is of the opinion that "a provision on consent in a BIT is merely an offer by the respective States that requires acceptance by the other party ... [which] , may be accepted by a national of the other State party to the BIT."' 2 ' In this sense, "consent is only perfected after it has been accepted by both parties. Therefore
This line of reasoning implies that the only way an investor may sue the host state before ICSID after denunciation is by having given notice in writing of his consent as required by §25(1), and thus perfecting the consent. Under this theory, the investor must always "perform some reciprocal act to perfect consent." 12 3 Consequently, if the country has withdrawn its unilateral offer to consent prior the perfection of such consent, the investor will no longer be able to sue before ICSID. The consequences of his position were recently reiterated by Professor Schreuter in relation to Bolivia's case.' 2 4 By the same token, perhaps the most cited text in this subject is a discussion between Aron Broches and various country representatives at the origins of the Washington Convention. This conversation certainly reflects the position of the founding fathers of the Convention. At some point, Broches explained that the effects of the Convention would be extended after denunciation. In contractual cases:
Mr The conversation touched upon the subject of subsequent application of the Convention after denunciation in non-contractual and indefinite cases. Here, the participants expressly discussed the drafting of the current §72, to ensure a correct outcome in the hypothetical case of a country withdrawal from the Convention, while having BITs in force, mentioning the Centre.
Mr It is also important to remark that most of these discussions have been widely interpreted by the detractors of this theory in their writings. So even when the words of Mr. Broches seem to be self-explanatory, some authors (as seen below) try to find an explanation that would not invalidate the opposing theory: The strength of this offer-to-consent theory resides precisely in its historical roots, which links it to the very foundation of the Centre. Recently, a French author stated that:
[t]his viewpoint appears less than convincing as all the history of the Convention, combined with the writings of the most qualified authors, and customary international law point in the same direction: an offer to arbitrate is a proposal to do a thing. .. .usually accompanied by an expected acceptance, counter-offer, return promise or act.'1 3 1
In sum, if Bolivia's only source of non-contractual consent to ICSJD jurisdiction were contained in its Investment Protections Law, the proponents of the offer-to-consent theory would not have much of a problem. Once the law has been abrogated, the consent would have disappeared for of everybody. The problem arises when the parties of the dispute in question try to assert jurisdiction on a BIT. Here, the proponents of this view hold that even when the BIT in question is still in effect (because it has not been denounced or it is still in effect under the term established by the survival clause) after the expiration of the six months established in §72 the country, in this case Bolivia, may no longer be hailed into ICSID.
[just] Consent
This theory comprises different readings to the aforementioned interplay between §25(1), §71, and §72 of the Washington Convention. First, Professor Gaillard argues that great weight should be given to the actual language of the BITs. According to this author, wherever there is consent and not an offer to consent in the BIT, ICSID would still have jurisdiction even after denunciation.
13 2 Second, another study proposes the use of dynamic interpretation. The authors of this study state that: [ilt seems to be more than appropriate to apply the principle of dynamic treaty interpretation also to the ICSID Convention and thereby provide an understanding of the regulatory interplay of its articles 25 and 72 in conformity with present-day conditions of consenting to ICSID arbitration that does not run contrary to the original and current object and purpose of the Convention.' E. Gaillard explains that "consent to ICSID jurisdiction does not result from a State's status as Contracting Party to the Convention but, in accordance to §25(1), requires both parties' written consent to the Centre's jurisdiction. "1 3 6 Then the explanation on consent begins by commenting on the discussion transcribed above between Aron Broches and other country representatives.1 37 His posture in this particular area is simple, but very interesting:
[hiad the drafters of the ICSID Convention intended to refer to a State's 'agreement to consent' rather than to its 'consent,' they would have so provided. As a result, a denouncing State's consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre based on an investment protection treaty depends on the terminology used in the arbitration clause contained in that treaty.' 3 8
To clarify his position Professor Gaillard divides the types of consent contained in the different BITs as "unqualified consent," and "agreements to consent."'1 3 9 An example of the former is found in the language of §11 of the Bolivia-Germany BIT (use of the word 'shall'),' 4 0 and an 133. CHRISTIIAN These German Professors advocate for the dynamic treaty interpretation established in the Tyrer v. United Kingdom case, before the European Court of Human Rights. In this case, an International Treaty was considered "a living instrument which . .. must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions."'1 4 3 Accordingly, these Professors propose the application of this same methodology (i.e., the so-called "dynamic interpretation" of treaties) to the discussion of the founding fathers of the Washington Convention, in particular, to Mr. Broches' remarks. They believe that their suggestion finds strong support in §31(3)(9) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, which establishes the general rule of treaty interpretation and proscribes that "there shall be taken into account, together with the context: (c) any relevant rule of International law applicable in the relations between the parties."'1 4 4
The application of the dynamic treaty interpretation methodology to ICSID cases would drive these Professors to look at the "extraordinary number of international investment agreements that have entered into force since the adoption of the ICSID Convention, in particular more than 2,500 BITs, but also the more than 240 other international agreements that deal with economic activities and also contain investment provisions."1 14 5
Aside from the socio-economic and legal developments, another element to consider in this innovative methodology is the cause of such developments. Accordingly, these authors found that "all of these agreements are at least primarily also aimed at the promotion of foreign the rules of the laid Convention, to mediation and arbitration by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.") (emphasis added investment and, in order to reach that goal, at providing private investors with additional legal safeguards. " 4 6 Thus, the principle of dynamic treaty interpretation would provide a "balanced interpretative approach of upholding the original and still current objects and purposes of the ICSID Convention by taking into account subsequent developments in the realm of international law."1 14 7 Finally, by applying this principle to the issue of consent, these authors find that "if the respective BIT provides for consent this may only be revoked by bringing to a final end the legal effects of the BIT."1 148 In other words, Professors 'Jietje, Nowrot, and Wackernagel believe that Bolivia might be taken before ICSID after November 2, 2007, as long as its BITs referring to the jurisdiction of the Centre are still in effect, which includes the duration of the survival clauses. According to these authors, the core of Professor Orrego's remarks has a dichotomous foundation: even though the Washington Convention was drafted following a contractual type of consent in mind, this would not "affect the nature of international obligations incurred by the States in their ICSID consent."1 15 0 Hence, in their view, the consent given by a state in their BITs would amount to international obligations of such nation. The nature of these unilateral declarations was established in the case New Zealand v. France (a.k.a., the Nuclear Test Case), in which the International Court of Justice highlighted the differences between a private unilateral promise and a public unilateral promise, holding that the latter constitutes an International obligation binding upon such country. 51 In words of Nolan and Sourgens: "promises made by sovereigns are qualitatively different from those made by private individuals, as axiomatically all promises of the sovereign on the international stage are binding as a matter of international law."'1 5 2
Finally, these authors conclude their interesting theory by stating that if the consent contained in BITs is deemed as a valid International obligation of a country, this finding would be contrary to the offer-to-consent theory. Therefore, the consent of BITs would be sufficient to assert IC-SID's jurisdiction, even after a country denounces the Washington Convention. In their own words:
[ 
A Look Into the Future, and the Availability of Potential Avenues for Investors Harmed by Bolivia
Currently, it is impossible to predict with certainty what position is going to be adopted by ICSID Secretariat or by an ICSID Tribunal. The explanation about consent seems to be too abstract, but with significant potential consequences. On the one hand, it seems like the natural path would be to follow the offer-to-consent theory as this was advocated by the drafters of the Convention. But the other theory is supported by at least three persuasive explanations that seek to tailor any solution on a case-by-case basis, either by looking at the actual language of the BITs, or by undertaking a comprehensive dynamic interpretation.
For this reason, the safest grounds would probably be to expect that the theory of offer-to-consent is going to be applied, and hence, that Bolivia may no longer be hailed into ICSID. Despite the fact that Bolivia's move to withdraw from ICSID may potentially bring disastrous consequences to future inflows of FDI, our attention now must focus on the already existing FDI in Bolivia. Here, the logical issue that arises is whether existing foreign investors in Bolivia will be left totally unprotected in the eventual case that the government, for instance, decides to expropriate them without paying just compensation.
The answer is probably no. The vast majority of Bolivia's BITs, for example, contemplate the possibility of resorting to UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration, an option that may be particularly appealing at this stage, especially given that Bolivia is a signatory of the New York on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Notwithstanding this, there are some BITs concerning Bolivia, like the Bolivia-Belgium BIT, which refers to ICSID, 15 5 and other avenues (such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce) but does not refer to UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration. The question that has been asked here is whether the famous "MostFavored-Nation" clause ("MFNC"), which is included very often in BITs, can be used to extend the UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration option to other cases. For instance, as seen above, investors from Belgium do not have the option to initiate an UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration against Bolivia; however, at the same time their BIT contains the MiFNC in §12, which establishes that: "for all the issues related to the treatment of investments, the investors from either Contracting party enjoy, on the territory of the other party, the most-favored-nation treatment."'1 5 6
The case-law of the different arbitral tribunals in this particular issue seems to be inconsistent. In the cases Mafezzini, 15 7 Siemens, 1 58 Gas Natural,'" 9 and Suez, 16 0 different tribunals interpreted "silence or ambiguity as indicative that the MIFNC included, with certain limits, procedural provisions."'1 6 ' On the other hand, in the cases of Plama,1 6 2 Salini.' 6 3 and Telenor1 64 different tribunals found it impossible to use the MFNC to "by-pass a limitation in the very same BIT when the parties have not chosen language in the MFN clause showing an intention to do this, as has been done in some BITs."1 165 Therefore, it remains unclear whether the M[FNC could be used for extending jurisdiction to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal, governed by the UNCLTRAL rules. But, in the rare cases where UNCITRAL arbitration is not an option, an ICC arbitration could then be an ideal venue for the investors. 
B. ECUADOR'S OIL AND GAS EXCLUSION AND
SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL
Background
The adoption of free-market policies began in Ecuador in the presidency of Sixto Durin Ball6n in the early 1990S.166 President Durin implemented a series of free market policies in order to open the country to foreign capital.1 6 7 For these means, Ecuador became part of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in 1996,168 and signed approximately twenty-five percent of its BITs during the last year of Durin's presidency.1 69 Notwithstanding the efforts to liberalize FDI, the political instability of Ecuador grew after Durin; in fact from 1996 to 2000 Ecuador had four presidents. But, from 1992 to 1994 the levels of FDI tripled "and subsequently doubled from 1996 to 1998."'no Even though unprecedented levels of inflation (more than 100 percent) accelerated the crisis in 1998, the inflows of FDI remained stable. In part, this increase happened because the "lion's share" of the FDI in the 1990s went to the oil and gas sector (more than 80 percent), 17 1 and those type of investments, once completed, tend to be less volatile and last for longer periods of time.
President Mahuad aggravated the social and political turmoil in Ecuador in 1998 when he announced the decision to dollarize the economy by making its currency, the Sucre, obsolete. 172 Two years later Mahuad was ousted and his Vice-President Gustavo Noboa assumed office. 7 3 Noboa restored some of the lost stability during his presidency when the dollarization, announced by Mahuad, was implemented and when he undertook important infrastructure projects, such as the construction of a major pipeline.1 74 Noboa's successor, Colonel Lucio Gutierrez assumed control of the government on January 15, 2003, but was later impeached for charges of corruption and ousted from power. 75 Alfredo Palacio, Gutierrez' Vice-President, assumed office for the remaining twenty After assuming office, Correa announced his decision to halt the FTAs talks, and in October 2007 the Correa administration imposed a new tax on many foreign oil companies operating in Ecuador, ordering them to pay ninety-nine percent of their extraordinary income to the government. 18 Probably, to avoid a wave of new claims related to oil and gas the Ecuadorian government decided to exclude its consent to arbitrate this class of claims, and more recently, decided to denounce the Washington Convention and all its BITs.1 82 Notwithstanding this, in the last years major oil companies have sued Ecuador before ICSID. Once any of these still pending cases reach a final decision, its eventual enforcement or non-enforcement and any potential consequences for Ecuador will ultimately test the effectiveness of the ICSID system as an ideal mechanism to protect FDI. 
Legal Analysis of Ecuador's Exclusion
On December 4, 2007 the Republic of Ecuador formally notified to the ICSID Secretariat that it would not consent to Centre's jurisdiction in "disputes that arise in matters concerning the treatment of investment in economic activities related to the exploitation of natural resources, such as oil, gas, minerals, or others."1 8 4 The basis of such notification is found in §25 (4) In fact, these kinds of exclusions serve the purpose of limiting the scope of the Centre's jurisdiction, as was established in the case Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, a.s. v. The Slovak Republic.1 86 In this case the tribunal reasoned that if a Contracting State wishes to exclude a particular investment from the reach of the Convention, §25(4) provides a more suitable way to do so, rather than challenging the meaning of the term 'investment' under the Convention. The tribunal reasoned that the "acceptance of the Centre's jurisdiction with respect to the rights and obligations arising out of its agreement creates a strong presumption that it considered its transaction to be an investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention." 8 7 Furthermore, the arbitral tribunal stated that: , 2007 ) (providing La Repiblica de Ecuador no consentird en someter a la jurisdicci6n del CIADI, las diferencias que surjan en materias relativas a] tratamiento de una inversion, que se deriven de actividades econ6micas relativas al aprovechamiento de recursos naturales como petr6leo, gas, minerales u otros. Todo instrumento contentivo de la voluntad previamente expresada por la Repdblica del Ecuador en someter esta clase de diferencias a la jurisdicci6n del Centro, que no se haya perfeccionado mediante el expreso y explicito consentimiento de la otra parte previa la fecha de presentaci6n de esta notificaci6n, es retirado por la Repdblica del Ecuador, con eficacia inmediata a partir de esta fecha). 185. Washington Convention, supra note 11, art. 25(4). 186. Gaillard Applying the tribunal's reasoning to Ecuador, after the December 4, 2007 notification the country has limited the scope of the Centre's jurisdiction in disputes arising from natural resources investments, including oil & gas, mineral, and others. In other words, by limiting the scope of ICSID's jurisdiction, Ecuador may not be sued anymore in those types of cases. An interesting consideration at this point is that some of the detractors of the offer-to-consent theory in BITs do not see any problem in a country effectively excluding the Centre's jurisdiction for a particular class of claims. For instance, Professor Gaillard wrote that:
While §72 of the Convention sets forth the effect of a state's denunciation in relation to its rights and obligations under the Convention, there is no comparable provision addressing the effect of a notification pursuant to §25(4). An investor's position is therefore more uncertain, even where the investment was made prior to the state's notification under §25(4).189 (emphasis added).
Professor Gaillard's explanation is based on the nature of the notification and not on the consent of the parties, which in turn is required by §25(1) in order to assert the jurisdiction of the Centre in a particular case. Such consent, once given may not be withdrawn.
According to Gaillard a §25(4) notification is neither an expression of consent nor a lack thereof.' 9 0 But the issue that has been omitted from this reasoning is what would happen when the consent for a particular dispute arises from a BIT that is still in force and the host country has subsequently excluded that particular class of claims. If, under Professor Gaillard's approach, the country may successfully exclude a particular type of claims from the Centre's jurisdiction, but may not do it through the denunciation of the Washington Convention (in case of having BITs with unqualified consent language still in force), then it would be possible to arrive to the counter-intuitive conclusion that in many situations exclusion is a more radical move than denunciation.
A significant legal issue that may arise from the topic of exclusion is whether exclusion may be used retroactively. This was addressed in the third case ever filed in ICSID, a contractual arbitration case: Alcoa Minerals Jamaica v. Jamaica.' 9 ' In 1968, Alcoa entered into an investment contract with Jamaica for the construction of an Alumina refining plant in exchange for a series of tax concessions, including a 'no-further-tax' clause and long-term leases for the mining of bauxite. 192 This agreement contained an ICSID arbitration clause. 193 In 1974 the Jamaican government indicated that the revenue from the mining of bauxite would be unilaterally increased, but since the parties could not reach an agreement on this issue, the government imposed a new tax on bauxite by enacting the Bauxite Act, which dramatically increased the government's revenue from the mining of bauxite. 1 94 But prior to the enactment of the Bauxite Act the Jamaican government notified the Centre, in accordance with §25(4), of the exclusion of disputes arising out from investments related to natural resources. 95 For this reason, when Alcoa decided to sue Jamaica before ICSID, Jamaica, relying on §25(4), did not appear before the ICSID Tribunal. 19 6 Nonetheless, the Tribunal found jurisdiction by deciding the issue of whether Jamaica's notification had the effect of withdrawing natural resources investment disputes from the scope of Jamaica's prior consent to arbitrate.'
The Tribunal's ruling in Alcoa on the consent to arbitrate is of crucial importance today. The tribunal found that the sole agreement of the parties to stipulate an ICSID arbitration clause constituted the consent required by §25(1), which may not be unilaterally withdrawn thereafter. Section 25(4)'s notification, according to the Tribunal, only operates for the future. A decision finding otherwise, "would very largely, if not wholly, deprive the Convention of any practical value."' 9 8 To celebrate this decision an author wrote that "the Alcoa Minerals result demonstrates the success of the ICSID Convention in dealing with the problem of State obligation to arbitrate, and the decision is a reassurance to the many investors presently relying upon ICSID arbitration clause." 9 9
Even though the Alcoa case involved a form of contractual consent (a clause compromissoire), it does reveal that a country may not step back on the issue of consent once it has acquired an irrevocable international obligation, such as the obligation that Jamaica had to appear before IC-SID in cases related to its 1968 Alumina/Bauxite contract with Alcoa. The case with Ecuador is potentially structurally different. After the formal notification of the exclusion it is clear that the country may not be hailed into ICSID in cases concerning new investments. But the afore- mentioned issue of foreign investments done in light of BITs in effect, prior to the formal notification, remains unanswered. In order to answer this question one should undertake an analysis of the issue of consent similar to the one performed with Bolivia's denunciation of the Washington Convention. For instance, under the theory of offer-to-consent Ecuador will no longer be bound to appear before IC-SID in cases that have not been filed prior to the notification of the formal exclusion, even if the investments were made before the exclusion and under the coverage of a BIT that is still in force. Conversely, under the theory of [just] consent Ecuador could still be subject to the Centre's jurisdiction in cases related to natural resources, notwithstanding the formal notification, if the investments were made prior to such notification under the coverage of a BIT that is still in force. Notwithstanding this, some supporters of the latter agree with the former result. The jurisdictional outcome of these five cases, Murphy, Burlington, Quirport, Perenco, and Repsol, will be extremely important for the Ecuadorian economy, and also for the future of the ICSJD in the region. If the ICSID tribunals decide to assert jurisdiction in these cases, Ecuador may be on the eve of facing potentially disastrous financial distress. On the one hand, such events could accelerate and give momentum to a move in the Latin American region against ICSID. On the other hand, these eventual decisions, as happened with the Alcoa case in the 1970s, may "better secure the good faith performance of investment agreements..
[by showing] that foreign investment need not be subject to national whim."1 2 0 ' Arguably, such a scenario could positively impact the fate of ICSID in the long run.
C. VENEZUELA'S INVES-rMENT PROTEC-riON APPROACH
Background
The father of Venezuelan opening for FDI in the early 1990s was President Carlos Andr6s P6rez, whose second term in office lasted four years. 2 02 After an impeachment on corruption charges, the Supreme Court ousted him from power in 1992.203 Perez's presidency undertook a major reform in the country that has been called "neo-liberal." Among the most relevant aspects of such reform were: (i) a major privatization of the country's public companies, including a national airline, the national phone company, and different electricity companies; (11) a liberalization of the interest rates, which, up until then were fixed by the Ministry of Finance; and (iii) a rise of the price of gas.
These reforms proved to be very unpopular. In fact, P6rez experienced great political turmoil during his second term in office. The first major hardship of Perez's presidency took place only twenty-five days after he took the presidential oath, on February 27, 1989 .204 An unprecedented social revolt (known as the Caracazo) marked the unpopularity of the free-market reforms proposed by P6rez in his presidential campaign. Years after the Caracazo, Perez suffered two failed coup-d'Etats in February and November of 1992 respectively. 2 0 5 A highlight of the February 4, 1992 coup-d'Etat was the appearance on television of Lieutenant Hugo Ch~ivez, who was one of the heads of the defeated rebels. In a brief speech addressed to his colleagues, Ch~ivez called for a cease-fire, personally assumed responsibility, and recognized the failure of the coup "for now. "206 After P~rez's impeachment, the head of the Venezuelan Congress, Ram6n J. VelAsquez, served for the remainder of the presidential term. 20 7 In 1993 elections, former President Rafael Caldera was elected for a second term in office .
2 08 During Caldera's second presidency, Venezuela experienced a rapid downward economic spiral. The government's response included the continuation of several of the unpopular economic measures adopted by Perez. Among the measures implemented in the framework of a program called Agenda Venezuela, were: the liberalization of the interest rates, the raise of the price of fuel, the devaluation of the currency rate, the imposition of a foreign currency exchange control regime, and the further opening of the oil sector to FDI, through the continuation of a program called the Apertura Petrolera.
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But the social, economical, and legal scenario would radically change in Venezuela after the December 1998 elections, when Ch~ivez gained power. The arrival of a former insurrectionist to power, four years after being condemned by the incumbent President Caldera, would drastically halt the free-market measures implemented by the past governments. In fact, when President Ch~ivez took office in February 1998, he promised a major reform of the National Constitution, and the saturation of a new economic system. 2 10 In 1999, a new Constitution was passed by a National Constituent Assembly, and following the passage of the new Constitution the ChAvez Administration gradually implemented a major legal reform, including the enactment of a new Hydrocarbons Law in 2001.211 Such reforms gave momentum to major strikes and public manifestations of discontent, which resulted in the ousting of Chivez in April of 2002 for two days. Shortly after his return to power, Chivez became more drastic in the implementation of his programs. Finally in February 2005, President Chivez said for the first time that his programs and policies were all directed towards the "Socialism of the 21st Century." 2 12
Meanwhile, the ChAvez Administration announced the strict application of the Hydrocarbons Law of 2001 through the implementation of the programs Plena Soberania Petrolera 2 13 and Siembra Petrolera. 2 14 These programs involved a process of renegotiation of oil contracts with private investors and a consequent dramatic increase of the country's share in the profits. The Apertura Petrolera had died. Yet some of the investors resisted until the end, to the mandated process of migration from a private to a mixed corporate form, involving a majority stake in the hands of the State. These investors, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, preferred to sue Venezuela before ICSID during the last trimester of 2007. 215 Whilst announcing the arrival of Socialism to Venezuela, Chdvez commenced a series of expropriations and nationalizations that changed the panorama for foreign investors and FDI. The first expropriations were targeted at agricultural farms and two of the highest-profile cases were Hato La Marquesedia, and Hato El Charcote. 216 the announcement of the de-privatization of the national phone company (CANTV); electricity, by the announcement of the de-privatization of the Caracas' power company (Electricidad de Caracas); and cement, by the announcement of the acquisition of the four largest cement companies (Andino, Caribe-Holcim, LaVega-Lafarge, and Vencemos-Cemex). These cases have also resulted in two ICSID claims against Venezuela.
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Notwithstanding that Venezuela has settled four of the six cases already before ICSJD, 21 9 the only two cases that have reached to an arbitral award did not involve large amounts. 2 20 Venezuela has taken some anti-arbitration measures directly targeted to potential claims that may arise out of the recent expropriations and nationalizations. Aside from the hostile political discourse against ICSID, the two most important antiarbitration steps taken by the country are the denunciation of the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT 22 1 and the Supreme Tribunal's Decision number 1541 of October 17, 2008 . 222 Yet the effects of these anti-arbitration measures remains to be seen in the other four cases against Venezuela currently outstanding before ICSID, 2 23 and in any other potential claim that may be filed in the near future.
Investment Protection Law and Decision 1541
This decision was delivered by the Constitutional Chamber of the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal, which is the highest court in the country, and also the only court whose decisions set binding judicial precedent (erga omnes effects). An interesting aspect about this decision is that it was rendered after a petition for the interpretation of §258 of the Venezuelan Constitution, filed by representatives of Venezuela's Attorney General Office.
22 4 Such constitutional mandate provides that "the law shall encourage arbitration, conciliation, mediation and any other alternative means for resolving conflicts."1 22 5 The object of the Attorney General's petition of interpretation was to limit the constitutional reach of §22 of the Law Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investment (LPPI), thereby excluding any consent of the Republic to arbitration on the basis of a unilateral consent contained in this provision. Section 22 of the LPPI establishes that:
Any dispute arising between an international investor whose country of origin has in effect an agreement for promotion and protection of investments with Venezuela, or any disputes to which the provisions of the Articles of Association of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) or the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (ICSJD) shall be submitted to international arbitration under the terms provided for in the respective treaty or agreement, should it so provide, without prejudice to the possibility of using the systems of litigation provided for in the Venezuelan laws in force, when applicable. 2 26 (emphasis added).
The motivation of the Attorney General's petition was narrowed to concerns caused recently by disputes arising from the renegotiation of the major oil & gas projects, in other words, as a response to ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips ICSID claims. Furthermore, the Tribunal in the 'whereas' section of the decision referred to the petitioners arguments and established that:
[ Thus, the Supreme Tribunal held that the meaning of the phrase "shall be submitted to international arbitration under the terms provided for in the respective treaty or agreement" contained in §22 of the LPPI, "denotes . . . that the intent of the legislator relates expressly and unequivocally to the internal content of the respective treaties," 230 and not to a unilateral consent of the Republic to submit any investment dispute to arbitration. According to the Tribunal, a converse interpretation would cause the absurd result that a sole mention of the Washington Convention by the Municipal Law of a country would automatically translate into the assertion of the country's consent, as required by §25(1) of the Convention, to submit a particular dispute to arbitration. 2 31 Moreover, in a scholarly article by Ms. Hildegard Rondon de Sanso, who is a prominent former Justice of the Venezuelan Supreme Court and a very influential figure linked to the Venezuelan Oil industry, she expressed her rejection for an interpretation of §22 LPPI as establishing unilateral consent. 232 Ms. Rondon de Sanso heavily criticized former legislator Dr. Allan Brewer Carfas, who said that the words "shall be submitted to international arbitration" in §22 LPPI implies the express consent of the country to submit the controversies to international arbitration. 233 Interesting enough, Ms. Rondon de Sanso tries to make an exegetical distinction in the norm, which also contains the phrase "as established thereunder" ("si asiste lo establece").
2 34 Ms. Rondon de Sanso found further fundamental grounds to the decision 1541 in the current legal framework of Venezuela. But Ms. Rondon de Sanso's own opinions expressed in the media reveal political or ideological biases in her legal analysis of this area. 235 according to which "even though the consent contained in a law may not be interpreted broadly or narrowly, it can only be interpreted objectively under the principle of good faith... ."239 Therefore, the Supreme Tribunal distinguished the Venezuelan provision from similar provisions of other countries, such as the one discussed in Southern Pacific, finding this reading to be in accord with the international principle of good faith.
It is likely that the most important effect of Decision 1541 would be that if an ICSID tribunal asserts jurisdiction on the basis of the unilateral consent of the Republic as contained in §22 of the LPPI, a potential adverse award would not be enforceable within the boundaries of Venezuela. In fact, the Supreme Tribunal expressly stated that "in case that the decision of the respective organism violates the internal juridical system, such decision would be unenforceable in the Republic." 240 An interesting study of the issue of consent to ICSID arbitration as contained in §22 LPPI disagrees with the Supreme Tribunal's finding. 24 1 The author of this study tries to reconcile a textual interpretation of the norm with the ultimate goals of the investor-State system of protection, by stating that: "[t]he fact that the law uses the term 'shall' and not 'may' could be of tremendous importance if a foreign investor were to rely on this provision to bring a case before ICSID, as it could make the allegatenidos en nuestro proceso hasta llegar, incluso al extremo de no priorizar la decisi6n de la cuesti6n de competencia, sino de permitir que la misma se debata conjuntamente con el fondo ( tion that the state committed itself to arbitrate.1 24 2 Nonetheless, the appreciation of this author regarding the future of this topic (as expressed in a footnote) proved to be exactly correct:
In any event, in recent years Venezuela has been involved in several significant international arbitrations that have been distasteful for the government and as a result it may be expected that Venezuela will move to reduce its exposure to international arbitral jurisdiction as, indeed, it has done with respect to the new petroleum sector joint ventures signed in early 2006.243 Another, more recent study has also been prophetic about this particular issue and the potential effects of decision 1541:
Venezuela is nonetheless very likely to seek all possible injunctions in order to avoid international arbitration. A final aspect to highlight on the Decision 1541 is its reference to the country's consent contained in BITs. In one part of the decision, the Supreme Tribunal stated that depending on the language of a particular BIT, by subscribing to it a country may be pledging its consent to further arbitrations. 2 45 But in the last part of the decision the Supreme Tribunal added an ambiguous paragraph, whose interpretation would define Venezuela's future approach to ICSID:
Finally we reiterate that the sole subscription of the ICSID Convention, by one, several, or all the States linked in the subject of investments by BITs, or MITs, does not constitute an automatic submission of the respective disputes to the procedures contained in such Convyention; being essential, at all times, the existence of a written unequivocal consent to arbitrate."1 2 46 (emphasis added).
The polar question that remains open with Venezuela is whether it will further accept the Centre jurisdiction and potential adverse awards in cases where consent has arisen both from the LPPI, and a BIT in effect, or whether Venezuela will adopt more radical solutions, such as a withdrawal A la Bolivia, or an exclusion and withdrawal A la Ecuador, or an annulment request attitude towards enforcement of an ICSID award A la Argentina. In spite of explosive anti-ICSID declarations by representatives of the Venezuelan government, Venezuela has not yet adopted a In order to answer those questions an element to consider would be the interlocutory decision of the Political and Administrative Chamber of the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal, in the case Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela (Aucoven) .
2 4 8 In this case the Supreme Tribunal dismissed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, filed by the foreign investor, on the grounds that the Nation waived its right to sue in domestic courts by including an arbitral clause in the concession agreement with the foreign investor. Indeed, by the time this decision was rendered an ICSID arbitral tribunal had already asserted jurisdiction over the case. But in Aucoven, the Supreme Tribunal established that the Venezuelan tribunals had to have jurisdiction to hear the case, notwithstanding the existence of a concession agreement with an arbitration clause vesting the ICSID with exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter . This should provide indication of the willingness of Venezuelan courts to recognize the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in every case.
Another element, perhaps more shocking, to consider is the political agreement on the campaign launched by the transnational corporation ExxonMobil against PDVSA, enacted by the National Assembly on February 13, 2008 and published in the Official Gazette number 38.869. Section V of such agreement of the legislature exhorted the President of the Republic to denounce the Washington Convention and withdraw from ICSID. A withdrawal from ICSID would likely cause a massive outflow of the FDI existing in Venezuela. Such measure in conjunction with the anti-capitalistic speech of the government and the recent trend of nationalizations, expropriations, and de-privatizations, may send a clear signal to the markets that the country is no longer interested in receiving or providing assurances to foreign capital. the lacunae left by the famous Barcelona Traction case. 25 0 In that case, the ICJ held that a State could make a claim when investments by its nationals abroad were prejudicially affected in violation of the right of the State itself to have nationals enjoy certain standards of treatment previously agreed in a treaty or special agreement. 2 5 1 Yet, the common situation when no such treaty or special agreement existed, thereby covering the particular conflict, was that investors would be left unprotected. Here, the Washington Convention and today's system of protection, as configured by the simultaneous existence of BITs and MITs, fits perfectly to cover this hole in the laws. But such assertion would only make sense if the countries in question are interested in seeking the ultimate goal of the investor-State system of protection: that of facilitating the flows of capital. In fact, thirty years ago, Paul Szasz pointed out that one of the reasons why Latin American Nations initially rejected the Convention was that not every country was keen to attract foreign capital. 25 2 At the time, it seemed reasonable to suspect that an anti-capitalistic government would avoid FDI.
D. CONCLUSIONS-ICSID AND LATIN
But today we live in a different world. Even when the resurgence of the left in the governments of Latin America have given momentum to a wide variety of anti-FDI measures, in today's world, the flow of capital between countries is a reality. Investors, whether from capitalistic, anticapitalistic, or mixed economies, seek protection for their investments abroad. This reasoning may not apply, however, in cases where public and not private funds are at stake. By mentioning the new positioning of Venezuela as a capital-exporter country in Latin America, 25 3 we may find an explanation to some of the anti-FDI measures commented. Yet this explanation comes with a caveat: first, even when the traditional forms of FDI protections are being rejected, new forms of protections will likely appear; and second, the flow of capital will be impacted by the fluctuations of the price of oil.
The fate of ICSID and the Washington Convention is still uncertain in Latin America. It is probably too early to predict what would be the ultimate consequences of Bolivia's withdrawal, Ecuador's exclusion, and Venezuela's growing reluctance to the Centre. In fact, in a Summit of UNASUR, 2 54 Venezuela fiercely promoted the creation of an alternative-maybe regional-center of investor-State dispute resolution, as an al- If such a time actually comes, we will find ourselves discussing the issue of consent. Meanwhile, the ICSID will continue to play a central role in the protection of FDI in the Latin American region. The extent of such role will be measure by the jurisdictional findings of the ICSID tribunals in the cases pending against Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. "Now more than ever," as was once stated, the effectiveness of ICSID arbitration "depends upon the power of the Convention to render agreements to arbitrate mutually binding." 
